The will to doubt : $b An essay in philosophy for the general thinkerLloyd, Alfred H. (Alfred Henry)
Philosophy
The will to doubt : $b An essay in philosophy for the general thinker
Lloyd, Alfred H. (Alfred Henry)
Belief and doubt; Philosophy -- Introductions
Yet some one promptly objects that I am not at all fair to the common
understanding of mechanicalism. I am told that no one ever thinks of
nature as revolving strictly in accord with any known law. All men who
give any thought to the matter concede that the really ultimate law must
be not anything that is known, but only what is yet to be known, and is
[p.220] merely like in kind to such laws as men have cognizance of. This
interesting concession, however, quite fails of its purpose, since it
does not meet the real difficulty here in question. It shows
mechanicalism, not indeed bound to any particular knowledge, but
nevertheless still conceiving the final lawfulness of nature _after the
analogy_ of a particular law, the merely known or unknown or unknowable
character of which matters not at all. The analogy is what misleads. The
analogy only serves to deaden what really lives.
When will men cease to think of the whole after the analogy of the part?
Of _the_, as if it were _a_? When will God cease to be only another
person? And the universe only another thing? And the lawfulness or unity
of all nature only another formula? This or that formula may show nature
a mechanism as smooth running and as blindly given to dead routine as
could be imagined, but nature is ever more and other than known formulæ
of men, and as more and other, or say as answering to the free spirit of
truth that moves in the thought of men, she is as free in her real
lawfulness as she is infinite. By reason of her infinity there is no law
that she may not break. _A_ law may make her a mechanism, dead and idle;
_the_ law makes her an organism living and productive. How a
positivistic science, making all knowledge wait on actual experience,
and accepting all knowledge only tentatively, can ever be
mechanicalistic or appeal to the ordinary understanding as an argument
for the mechanicalistic view of things is hard to conceive. If one
reasons from known forms to uniform activities, must one not also reason
from the always provisional [p.221] and developing knowledge to
productive activities? Must not the mechanism evolve into something
more, adding something to man's life, realizing something for all life,
enlarging even the nature of God himself?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account