The will to doubt : $b An essay in philosophy for the general thinkerLloyd, Alfred H. (Alfred Henry)
Philosophy
The will to doubt : $b An essay in philosophy for the general thinker
Lloyd, Alfred H. (Alfred Henry)
Belief and doubt; Philosophy -- Introductions
I said I should be abstruse, and I have not yet finished. In fully
appraising agnosticism we need to consider at close range another idea
of the positivist. Thus for the positivist knowledge is not a having,
but a getting--on the principle that unto him that hath shall be given;
not a knowing, but a questioning and seeking; not a being, but a
becoming--that has its ground in a being so real as to be without fixity
of form. And this is plainly equivalent to making movement and action
essential to the very nature of the knowing mind or to making knowledge
dynamic instead of static, and infinitely plastic--even like life
itself, that is always greater than its cross-sections or specific
forms. But in general to an active nature nothing can ever be quite
external; to a truly active nature there can be no essential
impossibility. For reflect. The mere existence of anything external or
of anything impossible would in just so far remove and deny the
intrinsic character of the activity; in just so far it would set the
supposedly active being in fixity of life and definiteness of form. For
an essentially active nature, therefore, all things--all things in
heaven and earth--are both present and possible, and so, specifically,
if that active nature be the knowing mind there can be no unknowable
that is at the same time alien and altogether impossible to the knower.
Even the very forms of the knower's knowledge must for ever compass
[p.125] pass more than they may visibly present. The knowing itself in
its own right and nature must be more than formal knowing, or than the
"objective," "special" science, in which the formal knowing has its
professional realization. And the knower, as he knows, in and through
his knowledge must always be compassing just that which is not
impossible to him, but only unknowable--that is, impossible merely to
his direct, formal knowledge. Is the inedible or the invisible or the
impenetrable or the unbearable or the illegible or even the
unintelligible ever wholly impossible? Such negatives, and in fact all
negatives, besides saving life from the narrowness of its various forms,
do this positive thing: they open the door of life's wider, nay, of
life's infinite opportunity or possibility, and at the same time they
render those various definite forms really mediative or instrumental,
making them parts in an essentially purposive existence. With just this
meaning, then, a meaning larger and deeper than that usual to
positivism, the attitude of the agnostic is instrumental and
teleological. Agnosticism simply endows the knower--must we not even put
our conclusion so?--with a wider freedom than that of knowledge, and yet
also makes his knowledge both share and serve the wider freedom that is
given.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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