Is this _true_? is there not perhaps a stronger guarantee of life and of the species in this victory of the weak and the mediocre?--is it not perhaps only a means in the collective movement of life, a mere slackening of the pace, a protective measure against something even more dangerous? Suppose the _strong_ were masters in all respects, even in valuing: let us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness, suffering, and sacrifice! _Self-contempt on the part of the weak_ would be the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate their kind. And would this be _desirable_?--should we really like a world in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, the _plasticity_--in fact, the whole influence of the weak--was lacking?[9] ... We have seen two "wills to power" at war _(in this special case we had a principle_: that of agreeing with the one that has hitherto succumbed, and of disagreeing with the one that has hitherto triumphed): we have recognised the "real world" as a "_world of lies_" and morality as a _form of immorality._ We do _not_ say "the stronger is wrong." We have understood _what_ it is that has determined the highest values hitherto, and _why_ the latter should have prevailed over the opposite value: it was numerically the _stronger_. If we now purify _the opposite value_ of the infection, the half-heartedness, _and the degeneration,_ with which we identify it, we restore Nature to the throne, free from moralic acid. [Footnote 9: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--We realise here the great difference between Nietzsche and those who draw premature conclusions from Darwinism. There is no brutal solution of modern problems in Nietzsche's philosophy. He did not advocate anything so ridiculous as the total suppression of the weak and the degenerate. What he wished to resist and to overthrow _was their supremacy, their excessive power._ He felt that there was a desirable and stronger type which was in need of having its hopes, aspirations, and instincts upheld in defiance of Christian values.] 402. _Morality,_ a useful error; or, more clearly still, a necessary and expedient lie according to the greatest and most impartial of its supporters. 403. One ought to be able to acknowledge the truth up to that point where one is sufficiently elevated no longer to require the _disciplinary school of moral error._--When one judges life morally, it _disgusts_ one. Neither should false personalities be invented; one should not say, for instance, "Nature is cruel." It is precisely when one perceives _that there is no such central controlling and responsible force that one is relieved!_ _Evolution of man._ A. He tried to attain to a certain power over Nature and over himself. (Morality was necessary in order to make man triumph in his struggle with Nature and "wild animals.")