Science: as a disciplinary measure or as an instinct--I see a decline of the instincts in Greek philosophers: otherwise they could not have been guilty of the profound error of regarding the conscious state as the more valuable state. The intensity of consciousness stands in the inverse ratio to the ease and speed of cerebral transmission. Greek philosophy upheld the opposite view, which is always the sign of weakened instincts. We must, in sooth, seek _perfect life_ there where it is least conscious (that is to say, there where it is least aware of its logic, its reasons, its means, its intentions, and its _utility)._ The return to the facts of _common sense,_ the facts of the common man and of "paltry people." _Honesty and intelligence_ stored up for generations of people who are quite unconscious of their principles, and who even have some fear of principles. It is not reasonable to desire a _reasoning virtue._ ... A philosopher is compromised by such a desire. 440. When morality--that is to say, refinement, prudence, bravery, and equity--have been stored up in the same way, thanks to the moral efforts of a whole succession of generations, the collective power of this hoard of virtue projects its rays even into that sphere where honesty is most seldom present--the sphere of _intellect._ When a thing becomes conscious, it is the sign of a state of ill-ease in the organism; something new has got to be found, the organism is not satisfied or adapted, it is subject to distress, suspense, and it is hypersensitive--precisely all this is consciousness.... Gennius lies in the instincts; goodness does too. One only acts perfectly when one acts instinctively. Even from the moral point of view all thinking which is conscious is merely a process of groping, and in the majority of cases an attack on morality. Scientific honesty is always sacrificed when a thinker begins to reason: let any one try the experiment: put the wisest man in the balance, and then let him discourse upon morality.... It could also be proved that the whole of a man's _conscious_ thinking shows a much lower standard of morality than the thoughts of the same man would show if they were led by his _instincts._ 441. The struggle against Socrates, Plato, and all the Socratic schools, proceeds from the profound instinct that man _is_ not made _better_ when he is shown that virtue may be demonstrated or based upon reason.... This in the end is the niggardly fact, it was the agonal instinct in all these born dialecticians, which drove them to glorify their _personal abilities_ as the _highest of all qualities,_ and to represent every other form of goodness as conditioned by them. The _anti-scientific_ spirit of all this "philosophy": it _will never admit that it is not right._ 442.