The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book III and IVNietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
PhilosophyPhilosophy
The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book III and IV
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm
Nihilism (Philosophy); Power (Philosophy); Values
For ages we have always ascribed the value of an action, of a
character, of an existence, to the _intention,_ to the _purpose_ for
which it was done, acted, or lived: this primeval idiosyncrasy of taste
ultimately takes a dangerous turn provided the lack of intention and
purpose in all phenomena comes ever more to the front in consciousness.
With it a general depreciation of all values seems to be preparing:
"All is without sense."--This melancholy phrase means: "All sense
lies in the intention, and if the intention is absolutely lacking,
then sense must be lacking too." In conformity with this valuation,
people were forced to place the value of life in a a life after death,
or in the progressive development of ideas, or of mankind, or of the
people, or of man to superman; but in this way the _progressus in
infinitum_ of purpose had been reached: it was ultimately necessary to
find one's self a place in the process of the world (perhaps with the
disdæmonistic outlook, it was a process which led to nonentity).
In regard to this point, "_purpose_" needs a somewhat more severe
criticism: it ought to be recognised that an action _is never
caused by a purpose;_ that an object and the means thereto are
interpretations, by means of which certain points in a phenomena
are selected and accentuated, at the cost of other, more numerous,
points, that every time something is done for a purpose, something
fundamentally different, and yet other things happen; that in regard
to the action done with a purpose, the case is the same as with the
so-called purposefulness of the heat which is radiated from the sun:
the greater part of the total sum is squandered; a portion of it, which
is scarcely worth reckoning, has a "purpose," has "sense"; that an
"end" with its "means" is an absurdly indefinite description, which
indeed may be able to command as a precept, as "will," but presupposes
a system of obedient and trained instruments, which, in the place of
the indefinite, puts forward a host of determined entities _(i.e._ we
imagine a system of _clever_ but narrow intellects who postulate end
and means, in order to be able to grant our only known "end," the rôle
of the "cause of an action,"--a proceeding to which we have no right:
it is tantamount to solving a problem by placing its solution in an
inaccessible world which we cannot observe).
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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