The Wonders of Life: A Popular Study of Biological PhilosophyHaeckel, Ernst
Philosophy
The Wonders of Life: A Popular Study of Biological Philosophy
Haeckel, Ernst
Biology; Evolution (Biology); Life -- Origin
Like all science, biology is _realistic_--that is to say, it regards
its object, the organisms, as really existing things, the features of
which are to an extent knowable through our senses (_sensorium_) and
organ of thought (_phronema_). At the same time, we know that these
cognitive organs, and the knowledge they bring us, are imperfect, and
that there may be other features of organisms that lie beyond our means
of perception altogether. But it by no means follows from this that,
as our idealist opponents say, the organisms (and all other things)
exist only in our mind (in the images in our cortex). Our pure monism
(or hylozoism) agrees with realism in recognizing the unity of being
of each organism, and denying that there is any essential distinction
between its knowable phenomenon and its internal hidden essence (or
noumenon), whether the latter be called, with Plato, the eternal
"idea," or, with Kant, the "thing in itself." Realism is not identical
with materialism, and may even be definitely connected with the very
opposite, dynamism or energism.
As realism generally coincides with monism, so idealism is usually
identical with dualism. The two most influential representatives of
dualism, Plato and Kant, said that there were two totally distinct
worlds. Nature, or the empirical world, is alone accessible to our
experience, while the spiritual or transcendental world is not. The
existence of the latter is known to us only by the emotions or by
practical reason; but we can have no idea of its nature. The chief
error of this theoretical idealism is the assumption that the soul is
a peculiar, immaterial being, immortal and endowed with _a priori_
knowledge. The physiology and ontogeny of the brain (together with the
comparative anatomy and histology of the phronema) prove that the soul
of man is, like that of all other vertebrates, a function of the brain,
and inseparably bound up with this organ. Hence this idealist theory
of knowledge is just as inconsistent with realistic biology as is the
psycho-physical parallelism of Wundt or the psychomonism of more
recent physiologists, which in the end issues in a complete dualism of
body and mind. It is otherwise with _practical_ idealism. When this
presents the symbols or ideals of a personal God, an immortal soul, and
the free-will as ethical stimuli, and uses them for their pedagogical
worth in the education of the young, it may have a good influence for a
time, which is independent of their theoretical untenability.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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