(M381) The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of such things proceeds from the fault & scantiness of language, as much perhaps as from obscurity & confusion of thought. Hence I may clearly and fully understand my own soul, extension, &c., and not be able to define them(224). (M382) The substance _wood_ a collection of simple ideas. See Locke, b. 2. c. 26. s. 1. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Mem. concerning strait lines seen to look at them through an orbicular lattice. Qu. Whether possible that those visible ideas wch are now connected with greater tangible extensions could have been connected with lesser tangible extensions,—there seeming to be no _necessary_ connexion between those thoughts? Speculums seem to diminish or enlarge objects not by altering the optique angle, but by altering the apparent distance. Hence Qu. if blind would think things diminish’d by convexes, or enlarg’d by concaves? (M383) Motion not one idea. It cannot be perceived at once. (M384) Mem. To allow existence to colours in the dark, persons not thinking, &c.—but not an actual existence. ’Tis prudent to correct men’s mistakes without altering their language. This makes truth glide into their souls insensibly(225). (M385) Colours in ye dark do exist really, i.e. were there light; or as soon as light comes, we shall see them, provided we open our eyes; and that whether we will or no. How the retina is fill’d by a looking-glass? Convex speculums have the same effect wth concave glasses. Qu. Whether concave speculums have the same effect wth convex glasses? The reason why convex speculums diminish & concave magnify not yet fully assign’d by any writer I know. Qu. Why not objects seen confus’d when that they seem inverted through a convex lens? Qu. How to make a glass or speculum which shall magnify or diminish by altering the distance without altering the angle? ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ No identity (other than perfect likeness) in any individuals besides persons(226). (M386) As well make tastes, smells, fear, shame, wit, virtue, vice, & all thoughts move wth local motion as immaterial spirit. On account of my doctrine, the identity of finite substances must consist in something else than continued existence, or relation to determined time & place of beginning to exist—the existence of our thoughts (which being combined make all substances) being frequently interrupted, & they having divers beginnings & endings. (M387) Qu. Whether identity of person consists not in the Will? ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ No necessary connexion between great or little optique angles and great or little extension. Distance is not perceived: optique angles are not perceived. How then is extension perceiv’d by sight?