The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
Its occasion and design, and its connexion with his spiritual conception
of the material world, are suggested in Sections 43 and 44 of the
_Principles_. Those sections are a key to the _Essay_. They inform us that
in the _Essay_ the author intentionally uses language which seems to
attribute a reality independent of all percipient spirit to the ideas or
phenomena presented in Touch; it being beside his purpose, he says, to
“examine and refute” that “vulgar error” in “a work on Vision.” This
studied reticence of a verbally paradoxical conception of Matter, in
reasonings about vision which are fully intelligible only under that
conception, is one cause of a want of philosophical lucidity in the
_Essay_.
Another circumstance adds to the embarrassment of those who approach the
_Principles_ and the three _Dialogues_ through the _Essay on Vision_. The
_Essay_ offers no exception to the lax employment of equivocal words
familiar in the early literature of English philosophy, but which is
particularly inconvenient in the subtle discussions to which we are here
introduced. At the present day we are perhaps accustomed to more precision
and uniformity in the philosophical use of language; at any rate we
connect other meanings than those here intended with some of the leading
words. It is enough to refer to such terms as _idea_, _notion_,
_sensation_, _perception_, _touch_, _externality_, _distance_, and their
conjugates. It is difficult for the modern reader to revive and remember
the meanings which Berkeley intends by _idea_ and _notion_—so significant
in his vocabulary; and _touch_ with him connotes muscular and locomotive
experience as well as the pure sense of contact. Interchange of the terms
_outward_, _outness_, _externality_, _without the mind_, and _without the
eye_ is confusing, if we forget that Berkeley implies that percipient mind
is virtually coextensive with our bodily organism, so that being “without”
or “at a distance from” our bodies is being at a distance from the
percipient mind. I have tried in the annotations to relieve some of these
ambiguities, of which Berkeley himself warns us (cf. sect. 120).
The _Essay_ moreover abounds in repetitions, and interpolations of
antiquated optics and physiology, so that its logical structure and even
its supreme generalisation are not easily apprehended. I will try to
disentangle them.
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