The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
1. My design is to shew the manner wherein we perceive by Sight the
Distance, Magnitude, and Situation of objects: also to consider the
difference there is betwixt the ideas of Sight and Touch, and whether
there be any idea common to both senses(286).
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2. It is, I think, agreed by all that Distance, of itself and immediately,
cannot be seen(287). For, distance(288) being a line directed endwise to
the eye, it projects only one point in the fund of the eye, which point
remains invariably the same, whether the distance be longer or
shorter(289).
3. I find it also acknowledged that the estimate we make of the distance
of objects considerably remote is rather an act of judgment grounded on
experience than of sense. For example, when I perceive a great number of
intermediate objects, such as houses, fields, rivers, and the like, which
I have experienced to take up a considerable space, I thence form a
judgment or conclusion, that the object I see beyond them is at a great
distance. Again, when an object appears faint and small which at a near
distance I have experienced to make a vigorous and large appearance, I
instantly conclude it to be far off(290). And this, it is evident, is the
result of experience; without which, from the faintness and littleness, I
should not have inferred anything concerning the distance of objects.
4. But, when an object is placed at so near a distance as that the
interval between the eyes bears any sensible proportion to it(291), the
opinion of speculative men is, that the two optic axes (the fancy that we
see only with one eye at once being exploded), concurring at the object,
do there make an angle, by means of which, according as it is greater or
lesser, the object is perceived to be nearer or farther off(292).
5. Betwixt which and the foregoing manner of estimating distance there is
this remarkable difference:—that, whereas there was no apparent
_necessary_ connexion between small distance and a large and strong
appearance, or between great distance and a little and faint appearance,
there appears a very _necessary_ connexion between an obtuse angle and
near distance, and an acute angle and farther distance. It does not in the
least depend upon experience, but may be evidently known by any one before
he had experienced it, that the nearer the concurrence of the optic axes
the greater the angle, and the remoter their concurrence is, the lesser
will be the angle comprehended by them.
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