The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
56. Now, in order to discover by what means the magnitude of tangible
objects is perceived by sight, I need only reflect on what passes in my
own mind, and observe what those things be which introduce the ideas of
greater or lesser into my thoughts when I look on any object. And these I
find to be, _first_, the magnitude or extension of the visible object,
which, being immediately perceived by sight, is connected with that other
which is tangible and placed at a distance: _secondly_, the confusion or
distinctness: and _thirdly_, the vigorousness or faintness of the
aforesaid visible appearance. _Cæteris paribus_, by how much the greater
or lesser the visible object is, by so much the greater or lesser do I
conclude the tangible object to be. But, be the idea immediately perceived
by sight never so large, yet, if it be withal confused, I judge the
magnitude of the thing to be but small. If it be distinct and clear, I
judge it greater. And, if it be faint, I apprehend it to be yet greater.
What is here meant by confusion and faintness has been explained in sect.
35.
57. Moreover, the judgments we make of greatness do, in like manner as
those of distance, depend on the disposition of the eye; also on the
figure, number, and situation(347) of intermediate objects, and other
circumstances that have been observed to attend great or small tangible
magnitudes. Thus, for instance, the very same quantity of visible
extension which in the figure of a tower doth suggest the idea of great
magnitude shall in the figure of a man suggest the idea of much smaller
magnitude. That this is owing to the experience we have had of the usual
bigness of a tower and a man, no one, I suppose, need be told.
58. It is also evident that confusion or faintness have no more a
necessary connexion with little or great magnitude than they have with
little or great distance. As they suggest the latter, so they suggest the
former to our minds. And, by consequence, if it were not for experience,
we should no more judge a faint or confused appearance to be connected
with great or little magnitude than we should that it was connected with
great or little distance.
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