The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
A preparatory draft of the Introduction to the _Principles_, which I found
in the manuscript department of the library of Trinity College, Dublin, is
printed in the appendix to this edition of Berkeley’s Philosophical Works.
The variations are of some interest, biographical and philosophical. It
seems to have been written in the autumn of 1708, and it may with
advantage be compared with the text of the finished Introduction, as well
as with numerous relative entries in the _Commonplace Book_.
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After this Introduction, the New Principles themselves are evolved, in a
corresponding spirit of hostility to empty abstractions. The sections may
be thus divided:—
i. Rationale of the Principles (sect. 1-33).
ii. Supposed Objections to the Principles answered (sect. 34-84).
iii. Consequences and Applications of the Principles (sect. 85-156).
i. Rationale of the Principles.
The reader may remember that one of the entries in the _Commonplace Book_
runs as follows:—“To begin the First Book, not with mention of sensation
and reflexion, but, instead of sensation, to use perception, or thought in
general.” Berkeley seems there to be oscillating between Locke and
Descartes. He now adopts Locke’s account of the materials of which our
concrete experience consists (sect. 1). The data of human knowledge of
existence are accordingly found in the ideas, phenomena, or appearances
(_a_) of which we are percipient in the senses, and (_b_) of which we are
conscious when we attend to our inward passions and operations—all which
make up the original contents of human experience, to be reproduced in new
forms and arrangements, (_c_) in memory and (_d_) imagination and (_e_)
expectation. Those materials are called _ideas_ because living mind or
spirit is the indispensable realising factor: they all presuppose living
mind, spirit, self, or ego to realise and elaborate them (sect. 2). This
is implied in our use of personal pronouns, which signify, not ideas of
any of the preceding kinds, but that which is “entirely distinct from
them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, by which they are
perceived.” In this fundamental presupposition Descartes is more apparent
than Locke, and there is even an unconscious forecast of Kant and Hegel.
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