The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
_Third objection._ (Sect. 42-44.) We actually _see_ sensible things
existing at a distance from our bodies. Now, whatever is seen existing at
a distance must be seen as existing external to us in our bodies, which
contradicts the foregoing Principles.
_Answer._ Distance, or outness, is not visible. It is a conception which
is suggested gradually, by our experience of the connexion between visible
colours and certain visual sensations that accompany seeing, on the one
hand, and our tactual experience, on the other—as was proved in the _Essay
on Vision_, in which the ideality of the _visible_ world is
demonstrated(470).
_Fourth objection._ (Sect. 45-48.) It follows from the New Principles,
that the material world must be undergoing continuous annihilation and
recreation in the innumerable sentient experiences in which it becomes
real.
_Answer_. According to the New Principles a thing may be realised in the
sense-experience of _other_ minds, during intervals of its perception by
_my_ mind; for the Principles do not affirm dependence only on this or
that mind, but on a living Mind. If this implies a constant creation of
the material world, the conception of the universe as in a state of
constant creation is not new, and it signally displays Divine Providence.
_Fifth objection._ (Sect. 49.) If extension and extended Matter can exist
only _in mind_, it follows that extension is an attribute of mind—that
mind is extended.
_Answer._ Extension and other sensible qualities exist in mind, not as
_modes_ of mind, which is unintelligible, but _as ideas_ of which Mind is
percipient; and this is absolutely inconsistent with the supposition that
Mind is itself extended(471).
_Sixth objection._ (Sect. 50.) Natural philosophy proceeds on the
assumption that Matter is independent of percipient mind, and it thus
contradicts the New Principles.
_Answer._ On the contrary, Matter—if it means what exists abstractly, or
in independence of all percipient Mind—is useless in natural philosophy,
which is conversant exclusively with the ideas or phenomena that compose
concrete things, not with empty abstractions.
_Seventh objection._ (Sect. 51.) To refer all change to spiritual agents
alone, and to regard the things of sense as wholly impotent, thus
discharging natural causes as the New Principles do, is at variance with
human language and with good sense.
_Answer._ While we may speak as the multitude do, we should learn to think
with the few who reflect. We may still speak of “natural causes,” even
when, as philosophers, we recognise that all true efficiency must be
spiritual, and that the material world is only a system of sensible
symbols, regulated by Divine Will and revealing Omnipresent Mind.
_Eighth objection._ (Sect. 54, 55.) The natural belief of men seems
inconsistent with the world being mind-dependent.
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