The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving
what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction,
concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this
matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice
of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate
and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties
in almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind
hath a power of framing _abstract_ ideas or notions of things(482). He who
is not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers
must needs acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract
ideas. These are in a more especial manner thought to be the object of
those sciences which go by the name of logic and metaphysics, and of all
that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime
learning; in all which one shall scarce find any question handled in such
a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is
well acquainted with them.
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7. It is agreed on all hands that the _qualities_ or _modes_ of things do
never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated from all
others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the
same object. But, we are told, the mind, being able to consider each
quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is
united, does by that means frame to itself _abstract ideas_. For example,
there is conceived by sight an object extended, coloured, and moved: this
mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple, constituent
parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frame the
abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not that it is possible
for colour or motion to exist without extension; but only that the mind
can frame to itself by abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of
extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension.
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