(M156) God may comprehend all ideas, even the ideas wch are painfull & unpleasant, without being in any degree pained thereby(131). Thus we ourselves can imagine the pain of a burn, &c. without any misery or uneasiness at all. (M157) Truth, three sorts thereof—natural, mathematical, & moral. (M158) Agreement of relation onely where numbers do obtain: of co-existence, in nature: of signification, by including, in morality. (M159) Gyant who shakes the mountain that’s on him must be acknowledged. Or rather thus: I am no more to be reckon’d stronger than Locke than a pigmy should be reckon’d stronger than a gyant, because he could throw off the molehill wch lay upon him, and the gyant could onely shake or shove the mountain that oppressed him. This in the Preface. (M160) Promise to extend our knowledge & clear it of those shamefull contradictions which embarrass it. Something like this to begin the Introduction in a modest way(132). (M161) Whoever shall pretend to censure any part, I desire he would read out the whole, else he may perhaps not understand me. In the Preface or Introduction(133). (M162) Doctrine of identity best explain’d by taking the Will for volitions, the Understanding for ideas. The difficulty of consciousness of wt are never acted surely solv’d thereby. (M163) I must acknowledge myself beholding to the philosophers who have gone before me. They have given good rules, though certainly they do not always observe them. Similitude of adventurers, who, tho’ they attained not the desired port, they by their wrecks have made known the rocks and sands, whereby the passage of aftercomers is made more secure & easy. Preface or Introduction. (M164) The opinion that men had ideas of moral actions(134) has render’d the demonstrating ethiques very difficult to them. (M165) An idea being itself unactive cannot be the resemblance or image of an active thing. (M166) Excuse to be made in the Introduction for using the word _idea_, viz. because it has obtain’d. But a caution must be added. Scripture and possibility are the onely proofs(135) with Malbranch. Add to these what he calls a great propension to think so: this perhaps may be questioned. Perhaps men, if they think before they speak, will not be found so thoroughly persuaded of the existence of Matter. (M167) On second thoughts I am on t’other extream. I am certain of that wch Malbranch seems to doubt of, viz. the existence of bodies(136). (M168) Mem. To bring the killing blow at the last, e.g. in the matter of abstraction to bring Locke’s general triangle in the last(137). (M169) They give good rules, tho’ perhaps they themselves do not always observe them. They speak much of clear and distinct ideas, though at the same time they talk of general abstract ideas, &c. I’ll [instance] in Locke’s opinion of abstraction, he being as clear a writer as I have met with.