(M298) Will, understanding, desire, hatred, &c., so far forth as they are acts or active, differ not. All their difference consists in their objects, circumstances, &c. (M299) We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of causes—physical & spiritual. (M300) The physical may more properly be called occasions. Yet (to comply) we may call them causes—but then we must mean causes yt do nothing. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M301) According to Locke, we must be in an eternal uneasiness so long as we live, bating the time of sleep or trance, &c.; for he will have even the continuance of an action to be in his sense an action, & so requires a volition, & this an uneasiness. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M302) I must not pretend to promise much of demonstration. I must cancell all passages that look like that sort of pride, that raising of expectation in my friend. (M303) If this be the case, surely a man had better not philosophize at all: no more than a deformed person ought to cavil to behold himself by the reflex light of a mirrour. (M304) Or thus, like deformed persons who, having beheld themselves by the reflex light of a mirrour, are displeased with their diseases. (M305) What can an idea be like but another idea? We can compare it with nothing else—a sound like a sound, a colour like a colour. (M306) Is it not nonsense to say a smell is like a thing which cannot be smelt, a colour is like a thing wh cannot be seen? ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M307) Bodies exist without the mind, i.e. are not the mind, but distinct from it. This I allow, the mind being altogether different therefrom(193). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M308) Certainly we should not see motion if there was no diversity of colours. (M309) Motion is an abstract idea, i.e. there is no such idea that can be conceived by itself. (M310) Contradictions cannot be both true. Men are obliged to answer objections drawn from consequences. Introd. (M311) The Will and Volition are words not used by the vulgar. The learned are bantered by their meaning abstract ideas. Speculative Math, as if a man was all day making hard knots on purpose to unty them again. Tho’ it might have been otherwise, yet it is convenient the same thing wch is M.V. should be also M.T., or very near it. (M312) I must not give the soul or mind the scholastique name “pure act,” but rather pure spirit, or active being. (M313) I must not say the Will or Understanding are all one, but that they are both abstract ideas, i.e. none at all—they not being even _ratione_ different from the Spirit, _quâ_ faculties, or active. (M314) Dangerous to make idea & thing terms convertible(194). That were the way to prove spirits are nothing. (M315) Qu. whether _veritas_ stands not for an abstract idea? ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐