Nay, let us observe how one of them wavereth from himself in seeking here some ground to rest upon. Paybody groundeth the lawfulness of kneeling at the sacrament on nature, part 2, cap. 4, sect. 1, on the act of Parliament, part 3, cap. 1, sect. 31; on an ecclesiastical canon, part 3, cap. 1, sect. 33, on the king’s sovereign authority, part 3, cap. 1, sect. 36. Yet again he saith, that this kneeling is grounded upon the commandment of God, part 3, cap. 3, sect. 11. Well, I see our opposites sometimes warrant the lawfulness of the ceremonies from the law of God, sometimes from the law of man, and sometimes from the law of nature, but I will prove that the lawfulness of those ceremonies we speak of can neither be grounded upon the law of God, nor the law of man, nor the law of nature, and by consequence that they are not lawful at all, so that, besides the answering of what our opposites allege for the lawfulness of them, we shall have a new argument to prove them unlawful. _Sect._ 2. I begin with the law of God. And, first, let us see what is alleged from Scripture for the ceremonies in general; then, after, let us look over particulars. There is one place which they will have in mythology to stand for the head of Medusa, and if they still object to us for all their ceremonies even that of the Apostle, “Let all things be done decently and in order,” 1 Cor. xiv. 40. What they have drawn out of this place, Dr Burges(819) hath refined in this manner. He distinguished betwixt _præceptum_ and _probatum_, and will have the controverted ceremonies to be allowed of God, though not commanded. And if we would learn how these ceremonies are allowed of God, he gives us to understand,(820) that it is by commanding the general kind to which these particulars do belong. If we ask what is this general kind commanded of God, to which these ceremonies do belong? he resolves us,(821) that it is order and decency: And if further we demand, how such ceremonies as are instituted and used to stir up men, in respect of their signification, unto the devout remembrance of their duties to God, are in such an institution and use, matters of mere order? as a magisterial dictator of _quodlibets_, he tells us(822) that they are matters of mere order, _sensu largo_, in a large sense. But lastly, if we doubt where he readeth of any worship commanded in the general, and not commanded, but only allowed in the particular, he informeth us,(823) that in the free-will offerings, when a man was left at liberty to offer a bullock, goat, or sheep at his pleasure, if he chose a bullock to offer, that sacrifice, in that particular, was not commanded, but only allowed. What should I do, but be _surdus contra absurdum_? Nevertheless, least this jolly fellow think himself more jolly than he this, I answer, 1st, How absurd a tenet is this, which holdeth that there is some particular worship of God allowed, and not commanded? What new light is this which maketh all our divines to