_Sect._ 7. 3d. If the church prescribe anything lawfully, so that she prescribe no more than she hath power given her to prescribe, her ordinance must be accompanied with some good reason and warrant given for the satisfaction of tender consciences. This condition is, alas! too seldom looked unto by law-makers, of whom one fitly complaineth thus:— Lex quamvis ratio Ciceroni summa vocetur, Et bene laudetur lex que ratione probatur, Invenies inter legistas raro logistas: Moris et exempli leges sunt juraque templi. But this fashion we leave to them who will have all their anomalies taken for analogies. It becometh not the spouse of Christ, endued with the spirit of meekness, to command anything imperiously, and without a reason given. _Ecclesioe enim est docere primum, tuin proescribere_, saith Camero.(890) And again: _Non enim dominatur cleris, nec agit cum iis quos Christus redemit, ac si non possent capere quod sit religiosum, quid minus._ Tertullian’s testimony(891) is known: _Nulla lex_, &c. “No law (saith he) owes to itself alone the conscience of its equity, but to those from whom it expects obedience. Moreover, it is a suspected law which will not have itself to be proved, but a wicked law, which not being proved, yet beareth rule.” It is well said by our divines,(892) that in rites and ceremonies the church hath no power “to destruction, but to edification;” and that the observation of our ecclesiastical canons “must carry before them a manifest utility.”(893) _Piis vero fratribus durum est, subjicere se rebus illis quas nec rectas esse nec utiles animadvertunt_.(894) If here it be objected, that some things are convenient to be done, therefore, because they are prescribed by the church, and for no other reason. For example, in two things which are alike lawful and convenient in themselves, I am bound to do the one and not the other, because of the church’s prescription. So that, in such cases, it seemeth there can be no other reason given for the ordinance of the church but only her own power and authority to put to order things of this nature. I answer, that even in such a case as this, the conveniency of the thing itself is anterior to the church’s determination; anterior, I say, _de congruo_, though not _de facto_, that is to say, before ever the church prescribe it, it is such a thing as (when it falleth out to be done at all) may be done conveniently, though it be not (before the church’s prescribing of it) such a thing as should and ought to be done as convenient. Which being so, we do still hold that the conveniency of a thing must always go before the church’s prescribing of it; go before, I mean, at least _de congruo_. Neither can the church prescribe anything lawfully which she showeth not to have been convenient, even before her determination.