_Sect._ 8. I come now to examine what is the judgment of formalists touching the binding of the conscience by ecclesiastical laws. Dr Field saith, that the question should not be proposed, whether human laws do bind the conscience, but “whether binding the outward man to the performance of outward things by force and fear of outward punishment to be inflicted by men, the non-performance of such things, or the non-performance of them with such affections as were fit, be not a sin against God, of which the conscience will accuse us,”(120) &c. Unto this question thus proposed and understood of human laws, and where no more is considered as giving them power to bind, but only the authority of those who make them; some formalists do give (as I will show), and all of them (being well advised) must give an affirmative answer. And, I pray, what did Bellarmine say more,(121) when, expressing how conscience is subject to human authority, he taught that conscience belongeth _ad humanum forum, quatenus homo ex praecepto ita obligator ad opus externum faciendum, ut si non faciat, judicat ipse in conscientia sua se male facere, et hoc sufficit ad conscientiam obligandam?_ But to proceed particularly. _Sect._ 9. I begin with Field himself, whose resolution of the question proposed is,(122) that we are bound only to give obedience to such human laws as prescribe things profitable, not for that human laws have power to bind the conscience, but because the things they command are of that nature, that not to perform them is contrary to justice or charity. Whereupon he concludeth out of Stapleton, that we are bound to the performance of things prescribed by human laws, in such sort, that the non-performance of them is sin, not _ex sola legislatoris voluntate, sed ex ipsa legum utilitate_. Let all such as be of this man’s mind not blame us for denying of obedience to the constitutions about the ceremonies, since we find (for certain) no utility, but, by the contrary, much inconveniency in them. If they say that we must think those laws to be profitable or convenient, which they, who are set over us, think to be so, then they know not what they say. For, exempting conscience from being bound by human laws in one thing, they would have it bound by them in another thing. If conscience must needs judge that to be profitable, which seemeth so to those that are set over us, then, sure, is power given to them for binding the conscience so straitly, that it may not judge otherwise than they judge, and force is placed in their bare authority for necessitating and constraining the assenting judgment of conscience.