As there are two kinds of subject matter, he says, namely, soul and body, so there are two arts, that which relates to the soul is political; the other, relating to the body, he is not able to describe by one name, but there are two divisions of it, gymnastics and medicine. In the political art legislation corresponds to gymnastics, and the judicial art to medicine. But flattery, perceiving that these four take the best possible care of the soul and body respectively, has divided itself fourfold, and feigns itself to be what it pretends, not really caring for what is best, but seducing ignorance by means of pleasure. Thus cookery puts on the garb of medicine, and pretends that it knows the aliment best for the body; and again, personal decoration feigns itself to be gymnastics. Then, he adds, what personal decoration is to gymnastics, that is sophistry to legislation, and what cookery is to medicine, that is rhetoric to justice; and so being proximate to each other, sophists and rhetoricians are confounded with legislators and judges[49]. ----- Footnote 49: § 44-47. ----- Are good rhetoricians, then, asks Polus, to be esteemed as vile flatterers in cities? Socrates replies that they appear to him to be of no estimation at all. But have they not the greatest power in cities? Not, if to have power is a good to him who possesses it. For what is it to have power? is it to do what one wishes, or what appears to one to be best? Polus admits that it is not good for a person devoid of understanding to do what appears to him to be best. He must therefore prove that rhetoricians possess understanding, otherwise, since to have power is a good, they cannot do what they wish. Polus, however, is unable to distinguish between doing what one wishes and doing what appears to be best, and therefore agrees to change positions with Socrates, and to answer instead of asking questions[50]. ----- Footnote 50: § 48-50. -----