καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος, that is, “with one argument after another.” Though Cousin translates it _et successivement tout différent de lui-mâne_, and Ast, _et rursus alia atque alia_, which may be taken in either sense, yet it appears to me to mean that, when a man repeatedly discovers the fallacy of arguments which he before believed to be true, he distrusts reasoning altogether, just as one who meets with friend after friend who proves unfaithful, becomes a misanthrope. ----- “You speak perfectly true,” I said. 90. “Would it not then, Phædo,” he said, “be a sad thing if, when there is a true and sound reasoning, and such as one can understand, one should then, through lighting upon such arguments as appear to be at one time true, and at another false, not blame one’s-self and one’s own want of skill, but at length through grief should anxiously transfer the blame from one’s-self to the arguments, and thereupon pass the rest of one’s life in hating and reviling arguments, and so be deprived of the truth and knowledge of things that exist?” “By Jupiter,” I said, “it would be sad indeed.” “In the first place, then,” he said, “let us beware of this, and let us not admit into our souls the notion, that there appears to be nothing sound in reasoning, but much rather that we are not yet in a sound condition, and that we ought vigorously and strenuously to endeavour to become sound, you and the others, on account of your whole future life, but I, on account of my death, since I am in danger at the present time, of not behaving as becomes a philosopher, with respect to this very subject, but as a wrangler like those who are utterly uninformed. 91. For they, when they dispute about any thing, care nothing at all for the subject about which the discussion is, but are anxious about this, that what they have themselves advanced shall appear true to the persons present. And I seem to myself on the present occasion to differ from them only in this respect; for I shall not be anxious to make what I say appear true to those who are present, except that may happen by the way, but that it may appear certainly to be so to myself. For I thus reason, my dear friend, and observe how interestedly, if what I say be true, it is well to be persuaded of it: but if nothing remains to one that is dead, I shall at least during the interval before death, be less disagreeable to those present by my lamentations. But this ignorance of mine will not continue long, for that would be bad, but will shortly be put an end to. Thus prepared then, Simmias and Cebes,” he continued, “I now proceed to my argument. Do you however, if you will be persuaded by me, pay little attention to Socrates, but much more to the truth, and if I appear to you to say any thing true, assent to it, but if not, oppose me with all your might, taking good care that in my zeal I do not deceive both myself and you, and like a bee depart leaving my sting behind.”