“What therefore I said should be defined, namely, what things they are which, though not contrary to some particular thing, yet do not admit of the contrary itself, as in the present instance, the number three though not contrary to the even, does not any the more admit it, for it always brings the contrary with it, just as the number two does to the odd, fire to cold, and many other particulars, consider then, whether you would thus define, not only that a contrary does not admit a contrary, but also that that which brings with it a contrary to that to which it approaches, will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with it. 124. But call it to mind again, for it will not be useless to hear it often repeated. Five will not admit the idea of the even, nor ten, its double, that of the odd. This double then, though it is itself contrary to something else[38], yet will not admit the idea of the odd; nor will half as much again, nor other things of the kind, such as the half and the third part admit the idea of the whole, if you follow me and agree with me that it is so.” “I entirely agree with you,” he said, “and follow you.” “Tell me again, then,” he said, “from the beginning; and do not answer me in the terms in which I put the question, but in different ones, imitating my example. For I say this because, besides that safe mode of answering, which I mentioned at first[39], from what has now been said, I see another no less safe one. For if you should ask me what that is, which if it be in the body will cause it to be hot, I should not give you that safe but unlearned answer, that it is heat, but one more elegant, from what we have just now said, that it is fire: nor, if you should ask me what that is, which if it be in the body, will cause it to be diseased, should I say that it is disease, but fever; nor, if you should ask what that is, which if it be in number, will cause it to be odd, should I say that it is unevenness, but unity, and so with other things. But consider whether you sufficiently understand what I mean.” 125. “Perfectly so,” he replied. “Answer me then,” he said, “what that is, which when it is in the body, the body will be alive?” “Soul,” he replied. “Is not this, then, always the case?” “How should it not be?” said he. “Does the soul, then, always bring life to whatever it occupies?” “It does indeed,” he replied. “Whether, then, is there any thing contrary to life or not?” “There is,” he replied. ----- Footnote 38: That is, to single. Footnote 39: See § 113. ----- “What?” “Death.” “The soul, then, will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with it, as has been already allowed?” “Most assuredly,” replied Cebes. “What then? how do we denominate that which does not admit the idea of the even?” “Uneven,” he replied. “And that which does not admit the just, nor the musical?” “Unmusical,” he said, “and unjust.” “Be it so. But what do we call that which does not admit death?”