The gentleman against whom this formidable charge is drawn up, is, I think, not suspected of any intention to have recourse either to force or flight; he has always appeared willing to be tried by the laws of his country, and to stand an impartial examination; he neither opposes nor eludes inquiry, neither flies from justice, nor defies it. And yet less, my lords, can I suspect, that those by whom he is accused, act from any motive that may influence them to desire a sentence not supported by evidence, or conformable to truth; or that they can wish the ruin of any man whose crimes are not notorious and flagrant, that they persecute from private malice, or endeavour to exalt themselves by the fall of another. Let us, therefore, my lords, inquire before we determine, and suffer evidence to precede our sentence. The charge, if it is just, must be, by its own nature, easily proved, and that no proof is brought may, perhaps, be sufficient to make us suspect that it is not just. For, my lords, what is the evidence of common fame, which has been so much exalted, and so confidently produced? Does not every man see that, on such occasions, two questions may be asked, of which, perhaps, neither can easily be answered, and which, yet, must both be resolved before common fame can be admitted as a proof of facts. It is first to be inquired, my lords, whether the reports of fame are necessarily or even probably true? A question very intricate and diffusive, entangled with a thousand, and involving a thousand, distinctions; a question of which it may be said, that a man may very plausibly maintain either side, and of which, perhaps, after months or years wasted in disputation, no other decision can be obtained than what is obvious at the first view, that they are often true, and often false, and, therefore, can only be grounds of inquiry, not reasons of determination. But if it appear, my lords, that this oracle cannot be deceived, we are then to inquire after another difficulty, we are to inquire, _What is fame?_ Is fame, my lords, that fame which cannot err? a report that flies, on a sudden, through a nation, of which no man can discover the original; a sudden blast of rumour, that inflames or intimidates a people, and obtains, without authority, a general credit? No man versed in history can inquire whether such reports may not deceive. Is fame rather a settled opinion, prevailing by degrees, and for some time established? How long, then, my lords, and in what degree must it have been established, to obtain undoubted credit, and when does it commence infallible? If the people are divided in their opinions, as in all publick questions it has hitherto happened, fame is, I suppose, the voice of the majority; for, if the two parties are equal in their numbers, fame will be equal; then how great must be the majority before it can lay claim to this powerful auxiliary? and how shall that majority be numbered?