That the Spaniards, sir, are now enabled to make resistance, and, perhaps, to insult and depopulate our colonies; that the French have despatched a fleet into the American seas, to obstruct, as may be conjectured, the progress of our arms, and that we are in danger of meeting opposition which we did not expect, is too evident to be concealed. But, sir, is not the spirit of our enemies the consequence rather of our cowardice than of their own strength? Does not the opposition to our designs, by whatever nation it shall be made, arise from the contempt which has been brought upon us by our irresolution, forbearance, and delays? Had we resented the first insult, and repaired our earliest losses by vigorous reprisals, our merchants had long ago carried on their traffick with security, our enemies would have courted us with respect, and our allies supported us with confidence. Our negotiations, treaties, proposals, and concessions, not only afforded them leisure to collect their forces, equip their fleets, and fortify their coasts; but gave them, likewise, spirit to resist those who could not be conquered but by their own cowardice and folly. By our ill-timed patience, and lingering preparations, we encouraged those to unite against us, who would, otherwise, have only hated us in secret; and deterred those from declaring in our favour, whom interest or gratitude might have inclined to assist us. For who will support those from whom no mutual support can be expected? And who will expect that those will defend their allies, who desert themselves? But, sir, however late our resentment was awakened, had the war been prosecuted vigorously after it was declared, we might have been now secure from danger, and freed from suspense, nor would any thing have remained but to give laws to our enemies. From the success of Vernon with so inconsiderable forces, we may conjecture what would have been performed with an armament proportioned to his undertaking; and why he was not better supplied, no reason has yet been given; nor can it be easily discovered why we either did not begin the war before our enemies had concerted their measures, or delay it till we had formed our own.