But having now, according to order, heard the petition, and found no reason to alter my opinion, I shall endeavour to convince the house that it ought not to be granted. The petition, sir, is so far from bearing any particular relation to the clause now before us, that it does not, in any part, mention the expedient proposed in it, but contains a general declaration of discontent, suspicion, apprehensions of dangerous proceedings, and dislike of our proceedings; insinuations, sir, by no means consistent with the reverence due to this assembly, and which the nature of civil government requires always to be paid to the legislative power. To suspect any man, sir, in common life, is in some degree to detract from his reputation, which must suffer in proportion to the supposed wisdom and integrity of him who declares his suspicion. To suspect the conduct of this senate, is to invalidate their decisions, and subject them to contempt and opposition. Such, and such only, appears to be the tendency of the petition which has now been read; a petition, sir, very unskilfully drawn, if it was intended against the clause under our consideration, for it has not a single period or expression that does not equally regard all the other clauses. If any particular objection is made, or any single grievance more distinctly pointed at, it is the practice of impresses, a hardship, I own, peculiar to the sailors; but it must be observed that it is a practice established by immemorial custom, and a train of precedents not to be numbered; and it is well known that the whole common law of this nation is nothing more than custom, of which the beginning cannot be traced. Impresses, sir, have in all ages been issued out by virtue of the imperial prerogative, and have in all ages been obeyed; and if this exertion of the authority had been considered as a method of severity not compensated by the benefits which it produces, we cannot imagine but former senates, amidst all their ardour for liberty, all their tenderness for the people, and all their abhorrence of the power of the crown, would have obviated it by some law, at those times when nothing could have been refused them. The proper time for new schemes and long deliberations, for amending our constitution, and removing inveterate grievances, are the days of prosperity and safety, when no immediate danger presses upon us, nor any publick calamity appears to threaten us; but when war is declared, when we are engaged in open hostilities against one nation, and expect to be speedily attacked by another, we are not to try experiments, but apply to dangerous evils those remedies, which, though disagreeable, we know to be efficacious.