have shown great reason to believe that it would not) to the uses of the war, it is evident that you would deceive yourselves, and would have but an equal number of raw, irregular, undisciplined, and much worse troops for it. But, sir, there is yet a stronger argument against the supply in money only. What are our views in supporting the queen of Hungary? Our views are _general_ and _particular_; _general_, to save the house of Austria, and to preserve a balance of power; _particular_, to prevent the French from making any farther acquisitions on this side of Flanders. The first might possibly be answered in a good degree, by giving that princess an equivalent in money; but the second cannot be securely provided against, without an army on this side of Europe in the British pay. Sir, is it not natural for every one of us to guard our vital parts, rather than our more remote members? Would not the queen of Hungary (stipulate and condition with her as you please) apply the greatest part of these subsidies in defence of her dominions in the heart of Germany? Might it not even induce her to enlarge her views, and to think of conquests and equivalents for what she has already lost, which it might be vain and ruinous for us to support her in? Would she not leave Flanders to shift for itself, or still to be taken care of by the Dutch and Britain? In such a case, if France should find it no longer possible to make any impression on her territories on the German side, what must we expect to be the consequence? I think it very visible she would on a sudden quit her expensive and destructive projects on that quarter, and there only carry on a defensive war, while she fell with the greater part of her force at once upon the Low Countries, which would by this measure be wholly unprovided; and she might there acquire in one campaign, before any possibility of making head against her, (which the Dutch would hardly attempt, and could certainly not alone be able to effect,) all that she has been endeavouring for the last century to obtain, and what no union of powers could be ever capable of regaining from her. All this will be effectually prevented by an army paid by us on this side of Europe; an army ready to march to the borders of her country, and to intercept her succours and supplies for the German war; an army, ready to protect the petty states, whose interest and inclination it apparently must be to declare for us, and to join their forces with us, when they no longer fear the power of France; an army, which may possibly give courage and spirit to greater powers, who may still doubt, without these vigorous measures, (after what they have formerly experienced,) whether they could even yet depend upon us; an army, (if the posture of affairs should make it necessary,) able to cause a powerful diversion to the French forces, by an attack upon Lorrain and Champagne, and still within distance to return upon its