The advice which the senate has often repeated to his majesty, has been to oppose the progress of France; and though it should be allowed, that he has been advised to proceed in concert _with his allies_, yet it must be understood to suppose such allies as may be found to have courage and honesty enough to concur with him. It cannot be intended, that he should delay his assistance till corruption is reclaimed, or till cowardice is animated; for to promise the queen of Hungary assistance on such terms, would be to insult her calamities, and to withhold our succours till she was irrecoverably ruined. The senate could not insist that we should stand neuter, till all those, who were engaged by treaty to support the Pragmatick sanction, should appear willing to fulfil their stipulations; for even France is to be numbered among those who have promised to support the house of Austria in its possessions, however she may now endeavour to take them away. Even with regard to that power from which most assistance may be reasonably expected, nothing would be more imprudent than to declare that we determine not to act without them; for what then would be necessary, but that the French influence one town in their provinces, or one deputy in their assemblies, and ruin the house of Austria in security and at leisure, without any other expense than that of a bribe. It was, therefore, necessary to transport our troops into Flanders, to show the world that we were no longer inclined to stand idle spectators of the troubles of Europe; that we no longer intended to amuse ourselves, or our confederates, with negotiations which might produce no treaties, or with treaties which might be broken whenever the violation of them afforded any prospect of that advantage; we were now resolved to sacrifice the pleasures of neutrality, and the profits of peaceful traffick, to the security of the liberties of Europe, and the observation of publick faith. This necessity was so generally allowed, that when the first body of troops was sent over, no objection was made by those who found themselves inclined to censure the conduct of our affairs, but that they were not sufficiently numerous to defend themselves, and would be taken prisoners by a French detachment; the ministry were therefore asked, why they did not send a larger force, why they engaged in hostilities, which could only raise the laughter of our enemies, and why, if they intended war, they did not raise an army sufficient to prosecute it?