[C] Ὑπὲρ δὲ ὧν ἀπορῆσαί μοι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τὴν σὴν παρέστη, ὦ φίλη κεφαλὴ καὶ πάσης ἔμοιγε τιμῆς ἀξία, βούλομαι δηλῶσαι· σαφέστερον γάρ πως ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμῶ μαθεῖν. ἔφησθα ὅτι τὸν ἐν τῇ πράξει παρὰ τὸν φιλόσοφον ἐπαινεῖς βίον, καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν σοφὸν ἐκάλεις μάρτυρα, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐν τῷ πράττειν εὖ τιθέμενον, καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν σκοποῦντα τοῦ τε πολιτικοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ θεωρίᾳ ζωῆς, διαπορεῖν ἄττα περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐν ἄλλοις προτιμᾶν, ἐπαινεῖν δὲ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς τῶν καλῶν πράξεων ἀρχιτέκτονας. [D] τούτους δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν εἶναι φὴς τοὺς βασιλέας, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ εἴρηκεν οὐδαμοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπὸ σοῦ προστεθεῖσαν λέξιν, πλέον δὲ θάτερον ἐξ ὧν παραγέγραφας ἄν τις νοήσειε. τὸ γὰρ “Μάλιστα δὲ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πράξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοίαις ἀρχιτέκτονας” εἰς τοὺς νομοθέτας καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς φιλοσόφους καὶ πάντας ἁπλῶς τοὺς νῷ τε καὶ λόγῳ πράττοντας, οὐχὶ δὲ εἰς τοὺς αὐτουργοὺς [264] καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων ἐργάτας εἰρῆσθαι νομιστέον· οἷς οὐκ ἀπόχρη μόνον ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ κατανοῆσαι καὶ τὸ πρακτέον τοῖς ἄλλοις φράσαι, προσήκει δὲ αὐτοῖς ἕκαστα μεταχειρίζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν ὧν οἱ νόμοι διαγορεύουσι καὶ πολλάκις οἱ καιροὶ προσαναγκάζουσι, πλὴν εἰ μὴ τὸν ἀρχιτέκτονα καλοῦμεν, καθάπερ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἡρακλέα καλεῖν εἴωθεν ἐν τῇ ποιήσει “μεγάλων ἐπιίστορα ἔργων,” αὐτουργότατον ἁπάντων γενόμενον. (But I should like to make clear to you the points in your letter by which I am puzzled, my dearest friend to whom I especially am bound to pay every honour: for I am eager to be more precisely informed about them. You said that you approve a life of action rather than the philosophic life, and you called to witness the wise Aristotle who defines happiness as virtuous activity, and discussing the difference between the statesman’s life and the life of contemplation, showed a certain hesitation about those lives, and though in others of his writings he preferred the contemplative life, in this place you say he approves the architects of noble actions. But it is you who assert that these are kings, whereas Aristotle does not speak in the sense of the words that you have introduced: and from what you have quoted one would rather infer the contrary. For when he says: “We most correctly use the word ‘act’ of those who are the architects of public affairs by virtue of their intelligence,”(409) we must suppose that what he says applies to lawgivers and political philosophers and all whose activity consists in the use of intelligence and reason, but that it does not apply to those who do the work themselves and those who transact the business of politics. But in their case it is not enough that they should consider and devise and instruct others as to what must be done, but it is their duty to undertake and execute whatever the laws ordain and circumstances as well often force them; unless indeed we call that man an architect who is “well versed in mighty deeds,”(410) a phrase which Homer