* And must not the enemies of _reason_ and _free-thinking_ be forced to confess, that this writer hath chosen an excellent guide for himself; since he so fully acknowledges, that no one yet has been rightly guided by it? Must not his present undertaking be granted to be the effect of cool and sober deliberation, since it only calls people of _all_, even the _meanest capacities_, to such an use of their reason, as the wisest of men and nations have always been strangers to? CHAPTER V. _Shewing that all the |mutability| of our tempers, the |disorders| of our passions, the |corruption| of our hearts, all the |reveries| of the imagination, all the |contradictions| and |absurdities| that are to be found in human life, and human opinions, are in effect the mutability, disorders, corruption, and absurdities of |human reason|._ IT is the intent of this chapter to shew, that altho’ common language ascribes a variety of faculties and principles to the soul, imputing this action to the blindness of our _passions_, that to the inconstancy of our _tempers_; one thing to the heat of our _imagination_, another to the coolness of our _reason_; yet, in strictness of truth, every thing that is done by us, is the action and operation of our reason, and is to be ascribed to it, as the sole principle from whence it proceeded, and by which it is governed and effected. And the different degrees of reason are in men, as the different degrees of love and aversion; as the different degrees of wit, parts, good nature, or ill nature, are in man. And as all men have naturally more or less of these qualities, so all men have naturally more or less reason: and the bulk of mankind are as different in reason, as they are in these qualities. As love is the same passion in all men, yet is infinitely different; as hatred is the same passion in all men, yet with infinite differences; so reason is the same faculty in all men, yet with infinite differences. And as our passions not only make us different from other men, but frequently and almost daily different from ourselves, loving and hating under great inconstancy; so our reason is not only different from the reason of other men, but is often different from itself; by a strange inconstancy, setting up first one opinion, and then another. So that when we talk of _human reason_, or a reason _common_ to mankind, we talk of as _various_, _uncertain_, and _unmeasurable_ a thing, as when we talk of a _love_, an _aversion_, a _good nature_, or _ill nature_, common to mankind; for these qualities admit of no variation, uncertainty, or mutability, but such as they directly receive from the _reason_ of mankind. For it is as much the reason of man that acts in all these tempers, and makes them to be just what they are, as it is the reason of man that demonstrates a mathematical proposition.