_Secondly_, Granting that all matters of religion must be agreeable to _right, unprejudiced_ reason; yet this could be no ground for receiving nothing in religion, but what _human_ reason could prove to be necessary; for _human_ reason is no more _right, unprejudiced_ reason, than a sinner is _sinless_, or a man an _angel_. Granting again, that a man may go a great way towards rectifying his reason, and laying aside its prejudices; yet no particular man can be a _better judge_ of the rectitude of his _own reason_, than he is of the rectitude of his own _self-love_, the brightness of his own _parts_, and the depth of his own _judgment_. For there is nothing to deceive him in _self-love_, in the opinion of his _own merit_, _wit_, and _judgment_, but what has the same power to deceive him, in the opinion of his own reason. And if, as our author says, “It be the fate of most sects to be the fondest of their ugliest brats.”¹ None seem so inevitably exposed to this fatality, as those whose religion is to have no form, but such as it receives from their own hearts. ¹ Page 184. _Thirdly_, A man that has his religion to chuse, and with this precious privilege, that he need not allow any thing to be matter of religion, but what his own reason can prove to be so, is in as fair a way to be governed by his _passions_, as he that has his _condition_ of life to chuse, with the liberty of taking that which his own reason directs him to. Does any one suppose, that nothing but _reason_ would direct him in the choice of his condition? Or that he would make the better choice, because he proceeded upon this maxim, that nothing could be right, but that which was agreeable to his _own reason_? Or that his tempers, his prejudices, his self-love, his passions, his partiality, would have no influence upon his choice, because he had resigned himself up to his _own reason_? Now it is just the same in the choice of a religion, as in the choice of a condition of life: as it is not a matter of speculation, but of _good_ and _evil_; so if it is left to be determined by our _own reason_, it rather appeals to our _tempers_, than employs our reason; and to resign ourselves up to our own reason, to tell us what ought, or ought not to be a matter of religion, is only resigning ourselves up to our tempers, ♦to take what we _like_, and refuse what we _dislike_ in religion. ♦ removed duplicate “to”