*8. Again, it passes for an extraordinary part of learning to understand history: that is, in other words, to know what a company of silly creatures called men, have been doing for almost these six thousand years. Now, what is my understanding the perfecter for this? I deny not, that there are some matters of fact, as the more remarkable turns of ecclesiastical history, and the greater revolutions of the civil world, which are of moment to be known; because, by discovering to us the conduct of divine providence, they supply us with occasions of acknowledging and adoring the wisdom and goodness of God. Neither do I deny, that there are many other historical passages, which may be of moment to be known; tho’ not as perfective of our understanding, but as touching our interest. And so it may be of moment to me to know, the clock has struck one, if I have made an assignation at that time; but sure the bare naked theory of the clock’s having struck one, will add but little to my intellectual perfection. The most trivial matter of fact in the world is worth knowing, if I have any concern depending upon it: and the greatest without that, is utterly insignificant. So that ’tis not from perfecting of our understanding, but from the relation they have to our interest, that these things deserve to be known. *9. I would desire the great magnifiers of history only to answer me this one question. Suppose such and such matters of fact, in the knowing which they perhaps glory more, than the actors themselves did in the doing them, had never been done? Suppose _Fabius_ had never weathered out _Hannibal_ by delays, nor _Cyrus_ took _Babylon_ by draining the river into the ditches: what diminution would this have been to the perfection of their understanding? They cannot say it would have been any. And why then should the knowing them now they are done, be reckoned an addition to it? And yet we find it is so, and that men study these things, not only for their use, (that we allow) but for their mere theory, placing learning in such history as has nothing to commend it, but only that it tells you, such and such things were done. Of this impertinent sort is the greatest part of the _Roman_ and _Grecian_ history: which, had not the world voted it for learning, would no more concern a man to know, than that a bird has dropt a feather upon the _Pyrenean_ mountains.