40. The sum of all this is: the measure of prosecuting learning and knowledge, is their usefulness to a good life. Consequently, all prosecution of them beyond or beside this end, is impertinent and immoderate. But such is the general prosecution of learning and knowledge, as is plain by appealing to the general conduct of study. It evidently follows, that the intellectual conduct of human life is justly chargeable with an immoderate and impertinent pursuit of knowledge. The CONCLUSION. TO what a narrow compass, by virtue of the preceding reflections, are these three things reduced, which use to take up so large a room, _viz._ Learning itself, the method of learning, and the desire and prosecution of learning? These indeed are great retrenchments, but such as are just and necessary to the regulation of our intellectual conduct. And now who can forbear making these two observations, 1. That this bookish humour, which every where so prevails, is one of the spiritual diseases of mankind, one of the most malignant relics of original depravation: it carrying in it the very stamp and signature of _Adam_’s transgression, which owed its birth to an inordinate desire of knowledge, 2. That those who have eyes, may in great measure spare them, and they who have not, should not much lament the want of them, upon account of learning. For my own part, I am so thoroughly convinced of the certainty of the principles here laid down, that I look upon myself as not only under a particular obligation, but almost a necessity of conducting my studies by them. The last of which has left such a deep impression upon me, that I now intend to follow the advice of the Heathen, (_Marcus Antoninus_, as I remember) ♦Τὴν τῶν Βιβλίων δίψαν ῥῖψον. _Rid thyself of the thirst after books_; and to study nothing at all but what serves to the advancement of piety and a good life. ♦ “Τὴν τῶν Βιϐλίων δίψαὑ ρίψον” replaced with “Τὴν τῶν Βιβλίων δίψαν ῥῖψον” I have now spent about 13 years in the most celebrated university in the world; in pursuing both such learning as the _academical_ standard requires, and as my private genius inclined me to. But in truth, when I think on my past intellectual conduct, I am as little satisfied with it as with my moral; being very conscious, that the greatest part of my time has been employed in unconcerning curiosities, such as derive no degree of moral influence upon the soul that contemplates them. But I have now a very different apprehension of things, and intend to spend my uncertain remainder of time, in studying only what makes for the moral improvement of my mind, and regulation of my life: being not able to give an account, upon any rational and consistent principles, why I should study any thing else.