to be found in the whole Digest; neither are there any modern writers whose ideas of law are at all narrower. It would be far more easy to heap up authorities on this article than to excuse the prolixity and tediousness of producing any at all in proof of a point which, though too often practically denied, is in its theory almost self-evident. For Suarez, handling this very question, _Utrum de ratione et substantia legis esse ut propter commune bonum feratur_, does not hesitate a moment, finding no ground in reason or authority to render the affirmative in the least degree disputable: "_In quaestione ergo proposita"_ (says he) "_nulla est inter authores controversia; sed omnium commune est axioma de substantia et ratione legis esse, ut pro communi bono feratur; ita ut propter illud praecipue tradatur_"; having observed in another place, "_Contra omnem rectitudinem est bonum commune ad privatum ordinare, seu totum ad partem propter ipsum referre_." Partiality and law are contradictory terms. Neither the merits nor the ill deserts, neither the wealth and importance nor the indigence and obscurity, of the one part or of the other, can make any alteration in this fundamental truth. On any other scheme, I defy any man living to settle a correct standard which may discriminate between equitable rule and the most direct tyranny. For if we can once prevail upon ourselves to depart from the strictness and integrity of this principle in favor even of a considerable party, the argument will hold for one that is less so; and thus we shall go on, narrowing the bottom of public right, until step by step we arrive, though after no very long or very forced deduction, at what one of our poets calls the _enormous faith_,--the faith of the many, created for the advantage of a single person. I cannot see a glimmering of distinction to evade it; nor is it possible to allege any reason for the proscription of so large a part of the kingdom, which would not hold equally to support, under parallel circumstances, the proscription of the whole.