It may be further objected, that, when the Irish requested the ratification of Parliament to those articles, they did, in effect, themselves entertain a doubt concerning their validity without such a ratification. To this I answer, that the collateral security was meant to bind the crown, and to hold it firm to its engagements. They did not, therefore, call it a _perfecting_ of the security, but an _additional_ security, which it could not have been, if the first had been void; for the Parliament could not bind itself more than the crown had bound itself. And if all had made but _one_ security, neither of them could be called _additional_ with propriety or common sense. But let us suppose that they did apprehend there might have been something wanting in this security without the sanction of Parliament. They were, however, evidently mistaken; and this surplusage of theirs did not weaken the validity of the single contract, upon the known principle of law, _Non solent, quae abundant, vitiare scripturas_. For nothing is more evident than that the crown was bound, and that no act can be made without the royal assent. But the Constitution will warrant us in going a great deal further, and in affirming, that a treaty executed by the crown, and contradictory of no preceding law, is full as binding on the whole body of the nation as if it had twenty times received the sanction of Parliament; because the very same Constitution which has given to the Houses of Parliament their definite authority has also left in the crown the trust of making peace, as a consequence, and much the best consequence, of the prerogative of making war. If the peace was ill made, my Lord Galmoy, Coningsby, and Porter, who signed it, were responsible; because they were subject to the community. But its own contracts are not subject to it: it is subject to them; and the compact of the king acting constitutionally was the compact of the nation.