He did not, however, think it proper to enter his answer on the records along with the bill of whose introduction he complained. On the declarations made by Mr. Barwell in his minute (September, 1776) your Committee observe, that, considering him only as an individual under prosecution in a court of justice, it might be sufficient for him to exhibit his defence in the court where he was accused; but that, as a member of government, specifically charged before that very government with abusing the powers of his office in a very extraordinary manner, and for purposes (as they allege) highly corrupt and criminal, it appears to your Committee hardly sufficient to say that he had answered elsewhere. The matter was to go before the Court of Directors, to whom the question of his conduct in that situation, a situation of the highest power and trust, was as much at least a question of state as a matter of redress to be solely left to the discretion, capacity, or perseverance of individuals. Mr. Barwell might possibly be generous enough to take no advantage of his eminent situation; but these unfortunate people would rather look to his power than his disposition. In general, a man so circumstanced and so charged (though we do not know this to be the case with Mr. Barwell) might easily contrive by legal advantages to escape. The plaintiffs being at a great distance from the seat of government, and possibly affected by fear or fatigue, or seeing the impossibility of sustaining with the ruins of fortunes never perhaps very opulent a suit against wealth, power, and influence, a compromise might even take place, in which circumstances might make the complainants gladly acquiesce. But the public injury is not in the least repaired by the acquiescence of individuals, as it touched the honor of the very highest parts of government. In the opinion of your Committee some means ought to have been taken to bring the bill to a discussion on the merits; or supposing that such decree could not be obtained by reason of any failure of proceeding on the part of the plaintiffs, that some process official or juridical ought to have been instituted against them which might prove them guilty of slander and defamation in as authentic a manner as they had made their charge, before the Council as well as the Court.