From the period of this great judgment to the trial of Warren Hastings, Esquire, the law has gone on continually working itself pure (to use Lord Mansfield's expression) by rules drawn from the fountain of justice. "General rules," said the same person, when he sat upon the bench, "are wisely established for attaining justice with ease, certainty, and dispatch; but the great end of them being _to do justice_, the Court will see that it be really obtained. The courts have been more liberal of late years in their determinations, and have more endeavored to attend to the _real justice_ of the case than formerly." On another occasion, of a proposition for setting aside a verdict, he said, "This seems to be the true way to come at justice, and what we therefore ought to do; for the true text is, _Boni judicis est ampliare justitiam_ (not _jurisdictionem_, as has been often cited)."[56] In conformity to this principle, the supposed rules of evidence have, in late times and judgments, instead of being drawn to a greater degree of strictness, been greatly relaxed. "_All evidence is according to the subject-matter to which it is applied._ There is a great deal of difference between length of time that operates as a bar to a claim and that which is used only by way of evidence. Length of time used merely by way of evidence may be left to the consideration of the jury, to be credited or not, or to draw their inferences one way or the other, according to circumstances. _I do not know an instance in which proof may not be supplied._"[57] In all cases of evidence Lord Mansfield's maxim was, _to lean to admissibility_, leaving the objections which were made to competency to go to credit, and to be weighed in the minds of the jury after they had heard it.[58] In objections to wills, and to the testimony of witnesses to them, he thought "it clear that the Judges ought to lean _against_ objections to the formality."[59] Lord Hardwicke had before declared, with great truth, "that the boundaries of what goes to the credit and what to the competency _are very nice, and the latter carried too far_"; and in the same case he said, "that, unless the objection appeared to him to carry a strong danger of perjury, and some apparent advantage might accrue to the witness, he was always inclined to let it go to his credit, only _in order to let in a proper light to the case, which would otherwise be shut out_; and _in a doubtful case_, he said, it was generally his custom _to admit the evidence_, and give such directions to the jury as the nature of the case might require."[60]