The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)Schopenhauer, Arthur
Philosophy
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)
Schopenhauer, Arthur
Idea (Philosophy); Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy; Will
This enables him easily to survey as a whole his life and the course of
the world, looking before and after; it makes him independent of the
present, enables him to go to work deliberately, systematically, and with
foresight, to do evil as well as to do good. But what he does he does with
complete self-consciousness; he knows exactly how his will decides, what
in each case he chooses, and what other choice was in the nature of the
case possible; and from this self-conscious willing he comes to know
himself and mirrors himself in his actions. In all these relations to the
conduct of men reason is to be called _practical_; it is only theoretical
so far as the objects with which it is concerned have no relation to the
action of the thinker, but have purely a theoretical interest, which very
few men are capable of feeling. What in this sense is called _practical
reason_ is very nearly what is signified by the Latin word _prudentia_,
which, according to Cicero (_De Nat. Deor._ ii., 22), is a contraction of
_providentia_; while, on the other hand, _ratio_, if used of a faculty of
the mind, signifies for the most part theoretical reason proper, though
the ancients did not observe the distinction strictly. In nearly all men
reason has an almost exclusively practical tendency; but if this also is
abandoned thought loses the control of action, so that it is then said,
“_Scio meliora, proboque, deteriora sequor_,” or “_Le matin je fais des
projets, et le soir je fais des sottises_.” Thus the man does not allow
his conduct to be guided by his thought, but by the impression of the
moment, after the manner of the brute; and so he is called irrational
(without thereby imputing to him moral turpitude), although he is not
really wanting in reason, but in the power of applying it to his action;
and one might to a certain extent say his reason is theoretical and not
practical. He may at the same time be a really good man, like many a one
who can never see any one in misfortune without helping him, even making
sacrifices to do so, and yet leaves his debts unpaid. Such an irrational
character is quite incapable of committing great crimes, because the
systematic planning, the discrimination and self-control, which this
always requires are quite impossible to him. Yet, on the other hand, he
will hardly attain to a very high degree of virtue, for, however much
inclined to good he may be by nature, those single vicious and wicked
emotions to which every one is subject cannot be wanting; and where reason
does not manifest itself practically, and oppose to them unalterable
maxims and firm principles, they must become deeds.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account