The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)Schopenhauer, Arthur
Philosophy
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)
Schopenhauer, Arthur
Idea (Philosophy); Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy; Will
Thus true philosophy must always be idealistic; indeed, it must be so in
order to be merely honest. For nothing is more certain than that no man
ever came out of himself in order to identify himself directly with things
which are different from him; but everything of which he has certain, and
therefore immediate, knowledge lies within his own consciousness. Beyond
this consciousness, therefore, there can be no _immediate_ certainty; but
the first principles of a science must have such certainty. For the
empirical standpoint of the other sciences it is quite right to assume the
objective world as something absolutely given; but not so for the
standpoint of philosophy, which has to go back to what is first and
original. Only consciousness is immediately given; therefore the basis of
philosophy is limited to facts of consciousness, _i.e._, it is essentially
_idealistic_. Realism which commends itself to the crude understanding, by
the appearance which it assumes of being matter-of-fact, really starts
from an arbitrary assumption, and is therefore an empty castle in the air,
for it ignores or denies the first of all facts, that all that we know
lies within consciousness. For that the _objective existence_ of things is
conditioned through a subject whose ideas they are, and consequently that
the objective world exists only as _idea_, is no hypothesis, and still
less a dogma, or even a paradox set up for the sake of discussion; but it
is the most certain and the simplest truth; and the knowledge of it is
only made difficult by the fact that it is indeed so simple, and that it
is not every one who has sufficient power of reflection to go back to the
first elements of his consciousness of things. There can never be an
absolute and independent objective existence; indeed such an existence is
quite unintelligible. For the objective, as such, always and essentially
has its existence in the consciousness of a subject, is thus the idea of
this subject, and consequently is conditioned by it, and also by its
forms, the forms of the idea, which depend upon the subject and not on the
object.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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