The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)Schopenhauer, Arthur
Philosophy
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)
Schopenhauer, Arthur
Idea (Philosophy); Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy; Will
Wit and ingenuity are also manifestations of the faculty of judgment; in
the former its activity is reflective, in the latter subsuming. In most
men the faculty of judgment is only nominally present; it is a kind of
irony that it is reckoned with the normal faculties of the mind, instead
of being only attributed to the _monstris per excessum_. Ordinary men show
even in the smallest affairs want of confidence in their own judgment,
just because they know from experience that it is of no service. With them
prejudice and imitation take its place; and thus they are kept in a state
of continual non-age, from which scarcely one in many hundreds is
delivered. Certainly this is not avowed, for even to themselves they
appear to judge; but all the time they are glancing stealthily at the
opinion of others, which is their secret standard. While each one would be
ashamed to go about in a borrowed coat, hat, or mantle, they all have
nothing but borrowed opinions, which they eagerly collect wherever they
can find them, and then strut about giving them out as their own. Others
borrow them again from them and do the same thing. This explains the rapid
and wide spread of errors, and also the fame of what is bad; for the
professional purveyors of opinion, such as journalists and the like, give
as a rule only false wares, as those who hire out masquerading dresses
give only false jewels.
Chapter VIII.(20) On The Theory Of The Ludicrous.
My theory of the ludicrous also depends upon the opposition explained in
the preceding chapters between perceptible and abstract ideas, which I
have brought into such marked prominence. Therefore what has still to be
said in explanation of this theory finds its proper place here, although
according to the order of the text it would have to come later.
The problem of the origin, which is everywhere the same, and hence of the
peculiar significance of laughter, was already known to Cicero, but only
to be at once dismissed as insoluble (_De Orat._, ii. 58). The oldest
attempt known to me at a psychological explanation of laughter is to be
found in Hutcheson’s “Introduction into Moral Philosophy,” Bk. I., ch. i.
§ 14. A somewhat later anonymous work, “_Traité des Causes Physiques et
Morals du Rire_,” 1768, is not without merit as a ventilation of the
subject. Platner, in his “Anthropology,” § 894, has collected the opinions
of the philosophers from Hume to Kant who have attempted an explanation of
this phenomenon peculiar to human nature. Kant’s and Jean Paul’s theories
of the ludicrous are well known. I regard it as unnecessary to prove their
incorrectness, for whoever tries to refer given cases of the ludicrous to
them will in the great majority of instances be at once convinced of their
insufficiency.
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