The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)Schopenhauer, Arthur
Philosophy
The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)
Schopenhauer, Arthur
Idea (Philosophy); Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy; Will
First Kant asserts, in this solution, obviously wrongly, that both sides
started from the assumption, as their first principle, that with the
conditioned the completed (thus rounded off) _series_ of its conditions is
given. Only the thesis laid down this proposition, Kant’s principle of
pure reason, as the ground of its assertions; the antithesis, on the other
hand, expressly denied it throughout, and asserted the contrary. Further,
Kant charges both sides with this assumption, that the world exists in
itself, _i.e._, independently of being known and of the forms of this
knowledge, but this assumption also is only made by the thesis; indeed, it
is so far from forming the ground of the assertions of the antithesis that
it is absolutely inconsistent with them. For that it should all be given
is absolutely contradictory of the conception of an infinite series. It is
therefore essential to it that it should always exist only with reference
to the process of going through it, and not independently of this. On the
other hand, in the assumption of definite limits also lies that of a whole
which exists absolutely and independently of the process of completely
measuring it. Thus it is only the thesis that makes the false assumption
of a self-existent universe, _i.e._, a universe given prior to all
knowledge, and to which knowledge came as to something external to itself.
The antithesis from the outset combats this assumption absolutely; for the
infinity of the series which it asserts merely under the guidance of the
principle of sufficient reason can only exist if the regressus is fully
carried out, but not independently of it. As the object in general
presupposes the subject, so also the object which is determined as an
_endless_ chain of conditions necessarily presupposes in the subject the
kind of knowledge corresponding to this, that is, the _constant following_
of the links of that chain. But this is just what Kant gives as the
solution of the problem, and so often repeats: “The infinity of the world
is only _through_ the regressus, not _before_ it.” This his solution of
the conflict is thus really only the decision in favour of the antithesis
in the assertion of which this truth already lies, while it is altogether
inconsistent with the assertions of the thesis. If the antithesis had
asserted that the world consisted of infinite series of reasons and
consequents, and yet existed independently of the idea and its regressive
series, thus in itself, and therefore constituted a given whole, it would
have contradicted not only the thesis but also itself. For an infinite can
never be given as a whole, nor an _endless_ series exist, except as an
endless progress; nor can what is boundless constitute a whole. Thus this
assumption, of which Kant asserts that it led both sides into error,
belongs only to the thesis.
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