Before so confidently affirming that life is a blessing worth desiring or giving thanks for, let one compare calmly the sum of the possible pleasures which a man can enjoy in his life with the sum of the possible sorrows which may come to him in his life. I believe the balance will not be hard to strike. At bottom, however, it is quite superfluous to dispute whether there is more good or evil in the world: for the mere existence of evil decides the matter. For the evil can never be annulled, and consequently can never be balanced by the good which may exist along with it or after it. “_Mille piacer’ non vagliono un tormento._”—Petr. (A thousand pleasures are not worth one torment.) For that a thousand had lived in happiness and pleasure would never do away with the anguish and death‐agony of a single one; and just as little does my present well‐being undo my past suffering. If, therefore, the evils in the world were a hundred times less than is the case, yet their mere existence would be sufficient to establish a truth which may be expressed in different ways, though always somewhat indirectly, the truth that we have not to rejoice but rather to mourn at the existence of the world;—that its non‐existence would be preferable to its existence;—that it is something which at bottom ought not to be, &c., &c. Very beautiful is Byron’s expression of this truth:— “_Our life is a false nature_,—’tis not in The harmony of things, this hard decree, This uneradicable taint of sin, This boundless Upas, this all‐blasting tree Whose root is earth, whose leaves and branches be The skies, which rain their plagues on men like dew— Disease, death, bondage—all the woes we see— And worse, the woes we see not—which throb through The immedicable soul, with heart‐aches ever new.” If the world and life were an end in themselves, and accordingly required theoretically no justification and practically no indemnification or compensation, but existed, for instance, as Spinoza and the Spinozists of the present day represent it, as the single manifestation of a God, who, _animi causa_, or else in order to mirror himself, undertook such an evolution of himself; and hence its existence neither required to be justified by reasons nor redeemed by results;—then the sufferings and miseries of life would not indeed have to be fully equalled by the pleasures and well‐being in it; for this, as has been said, is impossible, because my present pain is never abolished by future joys, for the latter fill their time as the former fills its time: but there would have to be absolutely no suffering, and death also would either have not to be, or else to have no terrors for us. Only thus would life pay for itself.