was it the view of Sir Berkeley Milne himself; for he disapproved strongly of Admiral Troubridge’s abandonment of the chase. Again it has been urged that the sentence, ‘Your first task should be to aid the French in the transportation of their African army,’ imposed upon Sir Berkeley Milne the duty of placing _all three_ of his battle cruisers west of Sicily. Thus wrested from their context and from the whole series of Admiralty telegrams, these directions have been made to serve as an explanation. Against them must be read the full text. On July 30, ‘Your first task should be to aid the French in the transportation of their African army _by covering and if possible bringing to action individual fast German ships, particularly “Goeben.”_‘[40] And again, on August 2, ‘_Goeben_ must be shadowed by two battle cruisers.’ And again on August 3, ‘_Goeben_ is your objective. Follow her and shadow her _wherever she goes_, and be ready to act on declaration of war, which appears probable and imminent.’ And again on August 4, ‘Good. Hold her. War imminent.’ Certainly if the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean had in reliance upon these dominant and reiterated instructions managed to put one battle cruiser each side of the Straits of Messina, instead of all on one side, and if in consequence he had brought the _Goeben_ to action, as would have been inevitable, and if he had thus protected the French transports in the most effectual manner by fighting the _Goeben_, no one could have found fault with him on the score that he had exceeded his orders. The reader is now in a position to form his own judgment on this affair. I have indicated plainly the point on which the Admiralty was in fault, namely, in not spontaneously lifting the prohibition to enter Italian waters the moment we learned the _Goeben_ was at Messina. The conduct of Rear-Admiral Troubridge was subsequently investigated by a Court of Inquiry composed of the three Commanders-in-Chief of Portsmouth, Devonport and Chatham. As the result of their report, he was tried by court-martial at Portland in September and honourably acquitted of all blame. His career in the Navy was, however, at an end, the general feeling of the Service not accepting the view that the four armoured cruisers and other vessels at his disposal ought not to have fought the _Goeben_. In view of his acquittal he was appointed to take charge of the naval guns which we sent with a mission to Serbia. In this capacity his work was distinguished and successful. He gained the confidence and respect of the Serbians and their Government, and he proved on numerous occasions that whatever might be thought of his reasons for not attacking the _Goeben_, want of personal courage was not among them.