The World Crisis, Volume 1 (of 6)Churchill, Winston
History
The World Crisis, Volume 1 (of 6)
Churchill, Winston
World War, 1914-1918; World War, 1914-1918 -- Great Britain
The Admiralty knew nothing of these movements beyond a report that he
was coaling at the Caroline Islands on August 9. Thereafter he vanished
completely from our view. We could know nothing for certain. The theory
of the Admiralty Staff, however, endorsed by Admiral Sir Henry Jackson,
who was making a special and profound study of this theatre, was that he
would go to the Marshall Islands and thereafter would most probably work
across to the west coast of South America, or double the Horn on his way
back to Europe. This theory, and the intricate reasoning by which it was
supported, proved to be correct. In the main, though we could by no
means trust ourselves to it and always expected unpleasant surprises, it
was our dominant hypothesis. It is on this basis that the operations in
the Pacific should be studied.
As early as August 2 the New Zealand Government—ever in the van of the
Empire—had convinced themselves that war was inevitable, and had already
made proposals for raising forces and striking at the enemy. The
Operations Division of the War Staff proposed in consequence the capture
of Samoa and the destruction of the wireless station there; and this was
recommended to me by the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Staff as a
feasible operation. By August 8 New Zealand telegraphed that if a naval
escort could be furnished the expedition to attack Samoa could start on
August 11. The staff concurred in this, holding that the _Gneisenau_ and
_Scharnhorst_ were adequately covered by the Australian squadron. I
assented the same day. It was arranged that the expedition should meet
the battle-cruiser _Australia_ and the French cruiser _Montcalm_ at or
on the way to Noumea.
Another expedition from Australia to attack German New Guinea had also
been organised by the Government of the Commonwealth. The uncertainty
about the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ invested all movements in those
waters with a certain hazardous delicacy. It was thought, however, that
the light cruisers _Melbourne_[57] and _Sydney_ could convoy the
Commonwealth New Guinea expedition northward, keeping inside the Barrier
Reef, and that before they came out into open waters the New Guinea
convoy could be joined by _Australia_ and _Montcalm_, who would by then
have completed the escort of the New Zealand expedition to Samoa. We
thought it above all things important that these expeditions, once they
had landed and taken possession of the German colonies, should be
self-sufficing, and that no weak warships should be left in the harbours
to support them. Any such vessels, apart from the difficulty of sparing
them, would be an easy prey for the two large German cruisers.
Samoa was occupied on the 30th August. The wireless station at Nauru was
destroyed on the 10th September. The Australian contingent was picked up
by the battle-cruiser _Australia_ on September 9 and arrived at Rabaul
safely two days later.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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