The World's Greatest Books — Volume 20 — Miscellaneous Literature and Index
General
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 20 — Miscellaneous Literature and Index
Literature -- Collections
What an infamous confession! No degree of friendship can justify
a crime; and since virtue is the foundation of friendship, crime
must inevitably undermine it. Let this, then, be the rule of
friendship--never to make disgraceful requests, and never to grant them
when they are made.
Among the perverse, over-subtle ideas of certain Greek philosophers is
the maxim that we should be very cool in the matter of friendship. They
say that we have enough to do with our own affairs, without taking on
other people's affairs too; and that our minds cannot be serenely at
leisure if we are liable to be tortured by the sorrows of a friend.
They advise, also, that friendships should be sought for the sake of
protection, and not for the sake of kindliness. O noble philosophy!
They put out the sun in the heavens, and offer us instead a freedom
from care that is worse than worthless. Virtue has not a heart of
stone, but is gentle and compassionate, rejoicing with the joyful and
weeping with those who mourn. True virtue is never unsocial, never
haughty.
With regard to the limits of friendship, I have heard three several
maxims, but disapprove them all. First, that we ought to feel towards
our friend exactly as we feel towards ourselves. That would never
do; for we do many things for our friends that we should never think
of doing for ourselves. We ask favours and reprehend injuries for a
friend, where we would not solicit for, or defend, ourselves. Secondly,
that our kindness to a friend should be meted out in precise equipoise
to his kindness to us. This is too miserable a theory: friendship
is opulent and generous. The third is, that we should take our
friend's own estimate of himself, and act upon it. This is the worst
principle of the three; for if our friend is over-humble, diffident or
despondent, it is the very business of friendship to cheer him and urge
him on. But Scipio used to condemn yet another principle that is worse
still. Some one--he thought it must have been a bad man--once said that
we ought to remember in friendship that some day the friend might be an
enemy. How, in that state of mind, could one be a friend at all?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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