On the other hand, the attempt of the Pompeian fleet to blockade Brundisium failed. After waiting two months, Marcus Antonius succeeded in making the passage, at a time when weather conditions made it impossible for the enemy’s ships to interfere with the landing. With this accession of strength, four legions and additional cavalry, Cæsar’s force was now superior to that of his opponent; but Pompeius was strongly intrenched on the shore, close to a city well supplied with provisions, and by means of his fleet, in communication with the rest of the world. The problem of supplies on Cæsar’s side was a difficult one, since the neighboring country was nearly exhausted. It was probably this reason which induced him to divide his force by sending some three and a half legions into the interior of the country, partly to intercept a Pompeian relieving army under Scipio, and partly to operate in Greece itself with a view of winning adherents for his cause. With the remainder he proceeded to inclose Pompeius’ camp, not so much to force a capitulation, which seemed hopeless because at any time they wished the Pompeian fleet could carry the army away, as to produce a moral effect on the Pompeians, who would be dispirited everywhere, when they learned that their leader was not acting on the offensive. The siege operations proved calamitous; Cæsar’s veterans suffered a severe defeat, and in some places the lines of the inclosing fortifications were destroyed. The other side, elated by victory, were now prepared for a decisive battle. This hazard Cæsar declined to take; instead of this he gave his troops time enough to recover from the effects of their defeat and then moved off from the coast, taking the road to Thessaly in order there to join the other detachments of his army, who were occupied in trying to force Scipio to an engagement.