Very different in every respect were the regular troops. These were of the best in China,—in fact the troops of Generals Nieh, Ma, and Tung-fu-Hsiang are second only to those of Yuan-Shi-Kai, the enlightened governor of Shantung, who, as some think luckily for the Europeans, preferred to sit on the gate and watch the trend of events, before taking any decisive and possibly disastrous move. He is a very able and progressive man, who doubtless saw the futility of attempting to cope with the world in arms, and so maintained a most correct attitude throughout. Many if not most of the troops who confronted the allies were foreign trained, it being an interesting fact that among the first instructors who were employed by the government was a naval gunnery instructor from H.M.S. “Cambridge,” also that among the British force during the attack on the Taku Forts was a gunner who had served the Chinese in the late Chinese-Japanese War. Their tactics and movements were certainly somewhat out of date, and consisted for the most part of parade movements, but several times the “attack” was carried out as laid down in the drill book, with the exception of the “Charge and Cheer,” without which, of course, the attack is doomed to failure against an enemy who is always disobliging enough to wait for “close quarters.” The efficiency of the various armies was to a great extent impaired by the diversity of their arms, and a great deficiency in knowledge of the simplest strategy. Another point, and an important one, was the utter want of ability to lead their men which was markedly displayed throughout by their company officers. Their general officers seemed capable of drawing their men up to an engagement skilfully, their guns were well posted, and their defensive positions good almost without exception; yet when the range became close there always appeared to be no one in command of the fighting line; the men acted independently, and what had often promised to be an overwhelming attack gradually fizzled away to a bloody repulse.