The World-Struggle for OilL'Espagnol de la Tramerye, Pierre Paul Ernest
History
The World-Struggle for Oil
L'Espagnol de la Tramerye, Pierre Paul Ernest
Petroleum; Petroleum industry and trade; War -- Economic aspects
Thus, the _Standard_ was dominant in France up to the War, fixing
prices and eliminating other importers. But, in spite of the lowering
of the customs duties in 1893 they still remained so high that the
_Conseil Supérieur de Navigation Maritime_, at its meeting of May 15,
1913, complained of the difficulties of procuring petroleum in France
at "reasonable terms." Mazut, the price of which is very low, could
not enter the country on account of the 9 francs duty, with which the
legislature had burdened it without discriminating between various
kinds of crude oil of greater or lesser value. In 1918, the world as a
whole was consuming 30 million tons of mazut, France not one quintal.
And her shipping was very much behind that of other nations with regard
to the use of the Diesel engine. Very few of her vessels burned oil.
"What absolutely prevents the fitting up of our ships" wrote the
Under-Secretary of State for the Merchant Marine, in a letter to the
Minister for Commerce on June 2, 1913, "is the exaggerated price of
liquid fuel caused by the fiscal exactions." On July 21st, M. Charles
Roux, president of the _Comité Central des Armateurs_, took steps to
obtain a lowering of these tariffs. They were without result until
1919, the year in which M. Clemenceau got the Chamber to pass the law
of August 7th, which lowered the import duties on mazut from 9 francs
to 0.40 francs. At last the prohibitive customs barrier was broken
down. The tax on coal was then 1.10 francs a ton. A ton of liquid fuel
paid duties _one hundred times as high_ (90 to 120 francs). From the
fiscal point of view, this tax brought in nothing to the Treasury. _It
was so high that it prevented all importation._ And thanks to that,
also, France was left behind by all her rivals.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 39: Henry Bérenger, _Le Pétrole et la France_, p. 280.]
[Footnote 40: Le Page, _L'Impérialisme du Pétrole_.]
[Footnote 41: 220 lb.]
CHAPTER XVIII
THE PETROLEUM CONSORTIUM
At the beginning of the War, the French State possessed no reserves
of petrol or petroleum: a new example of the unpreparedness so often
remarked!
The "refineries" disposed of a stock amounting at the end of July 1914,
according to the Customs statistics, to:--
408,200 quintals of crude oil,
433,560 quintals of refined oil,
342,090 quintals of petrol.
To meet the earliest needs, these were requisitioned. But, from the
month of September, this method was changed for that of contracts with
the "Ten." The cartel undertook to meet the needs of France; it made
itself responsible for purchases from abroad. The State was thus a mere
customer enjoying the rights of priority over other customers.
The consumption was then unimportant. At the time of the first battle
of the Marne, France had 22 squadrons of 6 aeroplanes (= 132), with
engines of 80 or 100 horse-power; 110 motor-lorries and 50 tractors (=
160). The Germans had 70,000![42]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account