In considering the potential strength of the armies which Russia, in the course of a long war, might put in the field, it may be pointed out that military service in that empire of more than 160,000,000 people is universal and compulsory. Service under the flag begins at the age of twenty and lasts for twenty-three years. Usually it is proportioned as follows: Three or four years in the active army, fourteen or fifteen in the Zapas, or first reserve, and five years in the Opolchenie, or second reserve. For the Cossacks, those fighters who are a conspicuous element of Russia’s military strength, there is hardly a cessation in discipline during their early manhood. Holding their lands by military tenure, they are liable to service for life. Furnishing their own equipment and horses—the Cossack is almost invariably a cavalryman—they pass through three periods of four years each, with diminishing duties, until they wind up in the reserve, which is liable to be called into the field in time of war. STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY Russia’s field army consists of three powerful divisions—the army of European Russia, the army of Asia, already referred to, and the army of the Caucasus. The European Russian field army consists of twenty-seven army corps—each corps comprising, at fighting strength, about 36,000 men—and some twenty-odd cavalry divisions, of 4,000 horsemen each. With the field army of the Caucasus and the first and second reserve divisions of the Cossacks, the total would be brought to nearly 1,600,000 men. With the Asiatic army, the grand total, according to the latest figures, would give the Russian armies a fighting strength of 1,850,000 men, of whom it would be practicable to assemble, say, 1,200,000 in a single theater of war. With respect to the armies which could be put in the field in time of urgent demand, there are conflicting estimates. It seems certain that Russia’s war strength is more than 5,500,000 men, but, of course, the train service and the artillery for such a force is lacking. Two and three-quarter million men could probably be mustered at one time. In the event of a prolonged war, in which the tide of affairs should put Russia strictly on the defensive, she would be less easily invaded than any large country of Europe. The very extent of her empire, protected by natural barriers at almost every side save where she touches Northeast Europe, would present almost insuperable difficulties to the invader. Napoleon paid dearly for his fortitude in pushing his columns into Moscow. The only conditions under which a repetition of such a feat is conceivable were not likely to be found during a general European struggle. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SLAVS