The Writings of James Russell Lowell in Prose and Poetry, Volume V: Political EssaysLowell, James Russell
History
The Writings of James Russell Lowell in Prose and Poetry, Volume V: Political Essays
Lowell, James Russell
United States -- Politics and government -- 1861-1865; United States -- Politics and government -- 1865-1869
No one can object more strongly than we to the mixing of politics with
personal character; but they are here inextricably entangled together,
and we hold it to be the duty of every journal in the country to join
in condemning a spectacle which silence might seem to justify as a
common event in our politics. We turn gladly from the vulgarity of the
President and his minister to consider the force of their arguments.
Mr. Johnson seems to claim that he has not betrayed the trust to which
he was elected, mainly because the Union party have always affirmed
that the rebellious States could not secede, and therefore _ex vi
termini_ are still in the Union. The corollary drawn from this is,
that they have therefore a manifest right to immediate representation
in Congress. What we have always understood the Union party as meaning
to affirm was, that a State had no right to secede; and it was upon
that question, which is a very different thing from the other, that the
whole controversy hinged. To assert that a State or States could not
secede, if they were strong enough, would be an absurdity. In point of
fact, all but three of the Slave States did secede, and for four years
it would have been treason throughout their whole territory, and death
on the nearest tree, to assert the contrary. The law forbids a man to
steal, but he may steal, nevertheless; and then, if he had Mr.
Johnson's power as a logician, he might claim to escape all penalty by
pleading that when the law said _should not_ it meant _could
not_, and therefore he _had not_. If a four years' war, if a
half million lives, and if a debt which is counted by the thousand
million are not satisfactory proofs that somebody did contrive to
secede practically, whatever the theoretic right may have been, then
nothing that ought not to be done ever has been done. We do not,
however, consider the question as to whether the Rebel States were
constitutionally, or in the opinion of any political organization, out
of the Union or not as of the least practical importance; for we have
never known an instance in which any party has retreated into the
thickets and swamps of constitutional interpretation, where it had the
least chance of maintaining its ground in the open field of common
sense or against the pressure of popular will. The practical fact is,
that the will of the majority, or the national necessity for the time
being, has always been constitutional; which is only as much as to say
that the Convention of 1787 was not wholly made up of inspired
prophets, who could provide beforehand for every possible contingency.
The doctrine of a strict and even pettifogging interpretation of the
Constitution had its rise among men who looked upon that instrument as
a treaty, and at a time when the conception of a national power which
should receive that of the States into its stream as tributary was
something which had entered the head of only here and there a dreamer.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account