Apologetics -- History -- Early church, ca. 30-600; Celsus (Platonic philosopher), active 180; Theology -- History -- Early Church, ca. 30-600
somewhat ambiguous, when he says, “In the beginning God made the heaven
and the earth.”[305] For it is certain that the firmament is not spoken
of, nor the dry land, but that heaven and earth from which this present
heaven and earth which we now see afterwards borrowed their names.
2. But since those rational natures, which we have said above were made
in the beginning, were created when they did not previously exist, in
consequence of this very fact of their non-existence and commencement of
being, are they necessarily changeable and mutable; since whatever power
was in their substance was not in it by nature, but was the result of
the goodness of their Maker. What they are, therefore, is neither their
own nor endures for ever, but is bestowed by God. For it did not always
exist; and everything which is a gift may also be taken away, and
disappear. And a reason for removal will consist in the movements of
souls not being conducted according to right and propriety. For the
Creator gave, as an indulgence to the understandings created by Him, the
power of free and voluntary action, by which the good that was in them
might become their own, being preserved by the exertion of their own
will; but slothfulness, and a dislike of labour in preserving what is
good, and an aversion to and a neglect of better things, furnished the
beginning of a departure from goodness. But to depart from good is
nothing else than to be made bad. For it is certain that to want
goodness is to be wicked. Whence it happens that, in proportion as one
falls away from goodness, in the same proportion does he become involved
in wickedness. In which condition, according to its actions, each
understanding, neglecting goodness either to a greater or more limited
extent, was dragged into the opposite of good, which undoubtedly is
evil. From which it appears that the Creator of all things admitted
certain seeds and causes of variety and diversity, that He might create
variety and diversity in proportion to the diversity of understandings,
_i.e._ of rational creatures, which diversity they must be supposed to
have conceived from that cause which we have mentioned above. And what
we mean by variety and diversity is what we now wish to explain.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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