part, must necessarily partake: But the supposed case of these persons is far different from that of the colonists; who are, not by a voluntary choice of their own, but through necessity, not by mere accident, but by means of the local distance of their constant residence, excluded from being present by representation in the British legislature. Chronus allows that by means of their distance, "they are become incapable of exercising their original right of choosing representatives for the British parliament." If so, they cannot without subversion of the end of the British constitution, be bound to obedience, against their own consent, to such laws as are there made; especially such laws as tend to render precarious their property, the security of which is the end of men's entering into society. If they are thus bound, they are slaves and not free men: But slavery must certainly be "repugnant to the constitution" which has liberty for its direct object. If the supreme legislative of Great Britain, cannot consistently with the British constitution or the essential liberty of the colonies, make laws binding upon them, and Chronus for ought I can see, has not attempted to make it rationally appear that it can, it is dangerous for the colonies to admit any of its laws. For however upright some may think the present parliament to be, in intention, they may ruin us through mistake arising from an incurable ignorance of our circumstances; and though Chronus may be so singular as to judge the present revenue acts of parliament binding upon the colonies, to be salutary, the time may perhaps come, when even he may be convinced, that future ones may be oppressive and tyrannical, not only in their execution, but in the very intention of those that may make them.